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The political economy of progressive fiscal contracts in Africa and Latin America1 
Paul Mosley and Abdul-Gafaru Abdulai2 
Structured abstract 
Motivation  
How can poorer developing countries escape from the vicious circle in which, because the state is 
fragile, those countries cannot raise sufficient public revenue to be able to finance development, 
leading to the persistence of poverty and state fragility? We explore a new approach to this 
problem, which we call progressive fiscal contracts, in which government earmarks the proceeds of 
particular taxes to be spent on forms of expenditure which will have widespread benefits for lower 
income groups, such as health, education and social protection. Taxpayers are thus offered a 
contractual relationship with government (better-targeted delivery of public services in return for 
tax payments) in place of a coercive one (simply being ordered to pay taxes, with nothing being 
offered in exchange). We seek to examine whether this kind of contractual approach offers a way 
forward for developing countries.  
Purpose  
Across five countries (Bolivia, Ecuador, Venezuela, Ghana and Zambia) between 2000 and 2015, we 
seek to find out whether tax yields have improved following the introduction of progressive fiscal 
contracts, whether conflict and poverty have declined, and whether there have been countervailing 
costs in terms of reduced efficiency. We also examine the experience of two countries (Brazil and 
Chile) where there is no formal ear-marking but government has encouraged the public to think of 
particular taxes as being associated with particular forms of expenditure.  
Approach and methods  
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We assess the impact of changes in tax yields, welfare indicators and conflict indicators by means of 
panel-data regressions, tabular comparisons and, in Bolivia, qualitative interviews. Changes in 
efficiency are assessed through examination of changes in tax structure. 
Findings  
Across all of the countries surveyed, the introduction of progressive fiscal contracts has been 
associated with a reduction in headcount poverty between 2000 and 2015, and in Bolivia our 
qualitative evidence suggests that the relationship can be seen as a causal one. In three cases out of 
five (Ghana, Bolivia and Ecuador) tax yields have increased, and in two (Ecuador and Bolivia) there 
was a significant reduction in political violence. In the Latin American cases examined, but not the 
African ones, there was a shift from royalty-based taxation to income-based taxation of natural 
resources, suggesting the likelihood of an improvement in efficiency over the period in those 
countries only. In these cases, the stereotypical view that progressive fiscal contracts improve equity 
at the expense of efficiency is contradicted. 
 Policy implications (or conclusions) 
‘Progressive fiscal contracts’, which originated as a device for making tax payments more palatable 
by offering social benefits in return, show promise as an innovative strategy for boosting tax ratios, 
reducing political violence and reducing poverty, which deserves further exploration. 
Keywords: Africa, Latin America, political economy, public expenditure, redistribution, taxation 
1.Introduction 
In many poorer developing countries, development is thwarted by weakness in their fiscal 
systems, both on the taxation and the expenditure side. Often they are trapped in a circular process 
in which, not being able to raise taxes or impose new ones for fear of political instability or loss of 
power, they are consequently not able to develop public services to the point of being able to 
deliver a sustained improvement in living standards, which makes their governments continue to be 
fragile (Moore, 1999; Brautigam et al., 2008; Mosley, 2015).  
One way of escaping from this trap, not to our knowledge previously analysed, consists of 
the introduction of what we call progressive fiscal contracts. In its essence this is taxing the rich 
explicitly to support the poor: for example, by increasing taxation on oil and mining multinationals or 
other higher-income tax bases, and then contractually tying this revenue to spending on social 
protection, human capital, or various kinds of labour-intensive expenditure. This idea, as we discuss 
below, has historical roots in Latin America but originated formally in the early twenty-first century 















as part of the alternative to the neoliberal approach of the World Bank and IMF in that continent, 
and has now spread to various other parts of the developing world. In this article, we explore the 
merits and limitations of this approach to developing tax revenue. 
 The argument proceeds as follows. Section 2 explains how developing countries, rich and 
poor, have sought to escape from the tax trap, illustrates the historical role of export taxes, 
especially mineral export taxes, in these strategies, and shows how progressive fiscal contracts have 
broadened out of export taxation to embrace other tax bases. Building on this, we analyse evidence 
on the welfare impact of progressive fiscal contracts in five developing countries. In Section 3, we 
examine the possible negative efficiency impacts of these measures, and whether and how they can 
be mitigated. Section 4 draws the threads of the argument together.  
 
 
 2. Alternative forms of ‘fiscal contract’ in Latin America and Africa 
 During the inter-war depression of the 1920s and 1930s, the administrations of many 
developing as well as industrialised countries established or increased their systems of import and 
export taxation in an attempt to protect their home markets and their public revenue (Lewis, 1949; 
O’Rourke, 2016). Often, the motive was purely protectionist; but in the larger countries of Latin 
America (Mexico, Argentina and especially Brazil) we begin to see at this time national 
administrations committing some of the fiscal resources thus derived to programmes of 
industrialisation (Diaz-Alejandro, 1983; Cardoso & Helwege, 1995; Hilton, 1975) and land reform 
(Signet, 2010; Bulmer-Thomas, 2014). The idea of some kind of connection between export taxation 
and anti-poverty policy is present here, but only in embryonic form: the proceeds of trade taxation 
are certainly used to finance developmental expenditures, but there is no contractual linkage of the 
proceeds of specific taxes to development, to welfare programmes or to other redistributive 
measures. 
 In many parts of Latin America, policies of import-substituting industrialisation (ISI) and land 
reform, often supported by trade taxation and deficit financing, continued into the early 1980s; but 
were then interrupted by the global financial crisis of that time, which forced Mexico and Argentina 
into outright default and many other developing countries into programmes of liberalisation and 
privatisation under the aegis of the IMF and World Bank – including the liberalisation of tax policies 
aimed at opening up the economy and thereby boosting growth (Sachs & Warner, 1995). However, 
in many developing countries, the policy conditionality applied to these programmes was not 















implemented (Mosley, Harrigan, & Toye, 1995), growth did not respond as planned, and by the 
millennium many Latin American countries were urgently arguing the case for, and implementing, a 
new economic model. This model like ISI would involve an increase in the level of state intervention 
in the economy, but by contrast with ISI would be committed to policies of fiscal rectitude and an 
increased measure of autonomy from the Washington institutions (Grugel & Riggirozzi, 2008). Such 
measures often involved the (re)imposition of price controls and export taxes, which had been the 
prime target for the World Bank’s liberalisations. And socially, they often involved the design of new 
forms of social protection through the medium of targeted cash transfers, such as Oportunidades in 
Mexico, Bolsa Familia in Brazil, and the Programa Jefes y Jefas de Familia in Argentina, which during 
the decade of the 2000s enabled the social safety net to be extended beyond urban formal-sector 
employees to encompass low-income households in the informal and agricultural sectors 
(Barrientos, 2013). Typically, and certainly in these three cases, the processes of designing export tax 
measures and allocating cash transfers for the poor were kept administratively separate. However, 
beginning just after the millennium, they were brought together, by earmarking the welfare benefit 
to be paid out of the proceeds of the export tax only. The earliest cases of this, to our knowledge, 
are two Bolivian schemes: the universal old-age pension or Renta Dignidad, established in 2005, 
which generalises the old-age pension from employees of large, mostly urban, companies to all 
households, and the education subsidy for low income groups, the Bono Juancito Pinto.,Both of 
these are publicly advertised as being financed from the Impuesto Directo en los Hidrocarburos (IDH) 
or direct tax on petroleum revenue, with the intention of making clear to the Movimiento al 
Socialismo (MAS) ruling party’s main support base, urban workers, that they are gaining twice, - not 
only through better social protection, but also through this being financed by hitherto untaxed 
multinationals. 
 Around the same time, a portion of the Ecuadorian corporate income tax was also 
designated to be spent on earmarked allowances for social protection, expenditure in low-income 
provinces, and universities, and in Venezuela, a doubling of the petroleum income tax, the Impuesto 
sobre la Renta (ISLR) was used to fund the Misiones social welfare initiatives of the Chávez 
government from 2003 onwards. After 2008, these revenues were then supplemented by a new tax 
on windfall incomes from hydrocarbons. These three governments, as pointed out by Eaton (2013) 
have much in common politically, being not only left-leaning but also committed to a reversal of the 
policies of decentralisation and regional devolution introduced with the support of the Washington 
financial institutions as part of the liberalising reforms of the 1990s (Eaton, 2013).  















 In Africa, the use of import and export taxes also expanded rapidly during the inter-war 
global depression, but in a quite different form, deriving from the fact that nearly all of those 
administrations were at that time under colonial rule. From the 1930s onward, farmers were 
typically paid a fixed producer price by the government marketing board for their crop, which was 
typically set well below the export realisation and thus amounted to an implicit export tax on 
primary producers (Bates, 1981)3. This export tax was typically presented by governments as a 
contribution to a ‘development fund’; however, with one distinguished exception, Mauritius4, there 
is little evidence from the colonial or even the first thirty years of the post-colonial period of these 
surpluses being effectively channelled into the development of local industries or even of the local 
export-based agriculture which provided the financing. However, during the liberalisation of the 
1990s, under pressure from the World Bank and other donors, many African marketing boards were 
either dissolved or reformed so as to provide higher incentives to export producers and greater 
transparency in the process by which export surpluses were channelled into developmental services. 
We can however find no evidence of explicit earmarking of commodity tax proceeds for social 
protection.  
When progressive fiscal contracts eventually arrived in Africa, they were attached to tax 
bases other than crop exports. In Zambia in 2006, Levy Mwanawasa’s MMD (Movement for Multi-
party Democracy) dominant-party government like Bolivia’s MNR5 ruling elite was faced with a 
challenge to the privileges of the mining corporations particularly from the urban poorest6. 
Mwanawasa explicitly decided, following the strategy of Morales in Bolivia, to link a subsidy for that 
group with fairer taxation of the multinationals. He imposed a windfall tax at a rate of 25% on gross 
proceeds, with 40% of the revenue earmarked for education and health spending and other local 
council expenditures in the poorest districts. This windfall tax was removed in 2009 by Mwanawasa’s 
successor, nominally reintroduced in 2011 (although there is currently no sign of the proceeds being 
linked to social protection as in 2008), and in that year complemented by a doubling of the rate of 
mineral royalty from 3% to 6%7. Thus the target for progressive fiscal contracts in Zambia, as in the 
                                                          
3 In respect of eight crops (palm kernels, palm oil, groundnuts, wattle bark, pyrethrum, coffee, cocoa and 
cotton) for which Bates was able to obtain data between 1945 and 1977, the price paid to the farmer was 54% 
of the export realisation; in other words, there was an average implicit tax rate of 46% for those crops over 
that period. Bates, 1981, appendix B, pages 137ff. 
4 On Mauritius see Mosley (2018). 
5 Movimiento Nacional Revolucionario (National Revolutionary Movement) 
6 Specifically, in the words of Cheeseman and Hinfelaar, from ‘not so much those in full-time wage 
employment, but more radical mineworkers and the unemployed in Zambia’s poorest urban compounds’ 
(Cheeseman and Hinfelaar, 2009, p. 77) 
7 There was a further attempt to raise the royalty paid by the most profitable mines in January 2015, but this 
was abandoned after the mining corporations concerned, First Quantum and Barrick Gold, threatened to leave 
the country. 















Latin American cases considered above, was the large mining corporations; but from 2011 onward 
Zambian governments, under the stress of falling minerals prices, have felt decreasingly able to 
challenge the large mining corporations to contribute their fair share of tax revenue8, and as a 
consequence government’s appetite for progressive fiscal contracts has diminished. There is some 
evidence that the design of the 2008 windfall tax was influenced by discussions during that year with 
the Chilean state copper-mining corporation CODELCO, which for many decades has contributed 
substantially to public revenue in a way which has been widely publicised in Chilean tax enforcement 
campaigns (Bergman, 2003).  
The other case where ‘progressive fiscal contracts’ have been attempted in Africa, namely 
Ghana, is quite different: here, the tax base for these contracts is much broader, consisting not only 
of mining corporations but also user charges and VAT, and the idea travelled not by way of Latin 
America, but via the IMF, with whom the Ghana government has since the liberalising reforms of the 
1980s had a surprisingly comfortable, even an indulgent, relationship9. 
In Ghana, windfall taxation of mining has been repeatedly experimented with, between 
1986 and 2006 and again between 2011 and 2014, but not linked to specific forms of public 
expenditure (Abdulai, 2017; Bebbington et al., 2018). Rather, the taxes which have been linked to 
social protection are, first of all, a ‘talk tax’ on mobile phone usage imposed in 2004 (Prichard, 2009, 
pp. 25-27) and used to finance expenditures on reducing youth unemployment; and much more 
substantially, national health insurance. Initially, in the late 1980s, the Ghana government financed 
health insurance payments, under an IMF/World Bank Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility, out 
of user charges on patients, but this scheme thereafter became increasingly unpopular, because of 
its regressive impact. Under this system where patients were required to pay for their health needs 
at the point of service delivery, many people either failed to seek medical attention or delayed doing 
so because of the intended charges that they were likely to face (Abdulai, 2019). This ‘cash and carry 
system’ was eventually replaced in 2004 by the then ruling NPP (New Patriotic Party) with a 
mandatory National Health Insurance Scheme (NHIS), which covers 95% of the disease burden in 
Ghana, and is principally financed by a 2.5% levy added to the value-added tax on goods and 
services. In principle VAT, as a tax base, is not as progressive as income tax, but like most developing 
                                                          
8 In particular, only the two most profitable mining companies in Zambia (the opencast mines at Kansanshi and 
Lumwana) pay corporate income tax or royalties on income, all other deep mines being exempted. See Mosley 
(2017, chapter 4). 
9 Since the reforms of the 1980s, Ghana has barely been able to control its budget deficit or, as a consequence, 
its inflation rate. Its macro-economic performance was classified by Adam and O’ Connell in 2006 as being 
within the ‘pre-stabilisation’ category, with inflation over 20% at the beginning of the 2000s (Adam & 
O’Connell, 2006, table 5.1).  















countries Ghana does not yet have a wide-coverage income tax system, and VAT is certainly much 
more progressive than the previous mainstay of Ghana’s public revenue10, the heavy implicit taxes 
(deductions from the price paid to the farmer) on the export of cocoa, a largely smallholder crop, 
under which Ghana laboured from their establishment in the 1930s to their partial abolition in 1992. 
The NHIS has had a major role in making politically feasible what one commentator describes as ‘the 
most dramatic, and prolonged improvement in tax collection of any country in Africa’ (Prichard, 
2009, p. 8). The key point about both of these reforms is that, like the Latin American cases 
previously examined, they were advertised to the public as a process by which citizens, instead of 
being coerced into paying their taxes, were encouraged to do so by the provision of better and fairer 
public services – a process which the formal linking of those operations helped to highlight. 
However, in the Ghanaian case the group paying the tax (and expected to benefit from the 
associated social expenditure) is expected to be broader and more stable than in the other four 
cases, where revenue is derived purely from extractive and mining operations. 
 These five cases are the only administrations which, to our knowledge, formally earmark 
specific tax revenues for redistributive purposes by means of a statutory legal instrument. However, 
as noted by Barrientos (2013) there are a number of administrations including Chile, Brazil and 
Argentina which although not engaging in formal earmarking nonetheless make a point of referring 
to specific tax initiatives as being explicitly for the purpose of social protection, and therefore 
supportive of the overall cause of poverty reduction. The logic of this approach was to reinforce 
political support for the state’s expenditure plans, often in fragile states, by illustrating that their 
financing derived from a precious, non-renewable natural resource –oil and gas reserves - which 
historically had been undertaxed because of being controlled by foreign (typically North American) 
interests (Grugel & Riggirozzi, 2009). Governments which went this route were, in effect, sending a 
signal that the linkage between taxation and progressive expenditure made the country a fairer 
place to live, and proposing a redistributive (i.e. progressive) fiscal contract, consisting of greater 
compliance with tax demands in exchange for fairer and better-targeted delivery of public services11. 
                                                          
10 It has been made more progressive especially by widespread exemptions granted especially to expectant 
mothers (Jehu-Appiah et al., 2011). However, there is also evidence here of the working of ‘Director’s Law’ 
(Stigler, 1970), according to which expenditures intended to benefit lower income groups are appropriated by 
the middle classes: the Ghana Trades Union Congress and the Ghana National Association of Teachers (GNAT) 
have been able to lobby successfully for exemption from paying workers’ contributions to the Social Security 
and National Insurance Trust, even though informal-sector workers who have no access to trade union 
leverage still have to pay in contributions to the trust. 
11 Both theoretical and survey-based evidence ( e.g. Buchanan & Tullock (1962) and Scholz & Lubell (1998) for 
the US, and more recently Bodea & Le Bas (2013) and Ali et al (2014) for African countries), now suggests that 
evidence of better-targeted public spending and more effective service delivery helps to generate a feeling of 
mutual obligation between taxpayers and the tax authority, which can form the basis for a fiscal social contract 
between taxpayers and government. Lenton, Masiye, & Mosley (2017, table 4) have shown that, across a 















Whether or not this kind of signal ‘works’, and actually delivers the political or economic benefits it 
claims to deliver, is obviously key to its effectiveness, and is the main thing which this paper seeks to 
discover. 
To this end, we now explore these five cases, three Latin American and two African, on a 
comparative basis, taking into account also the cases of ‘informal linkage’ mentioned by Barrientos. 
Table 1 presents evidence on the form which these initiatives have taken and the apparent impact 
which they have had.  
 
 
                                                          
sample of 61 less developed countries, greater equity and effectiveness in public spending are associated with, 
and appear to cause, higher ratios of tax revenue to national income. 














Table 1. Progressive fiscal contracts and their estimated effects  
1.Country 
 
2.Political ‘trigger’ for 
contractual 
relationship 
between tax and public 
and expenditure 
 3.Type of tax involved in contract 
 
 
4.Nature of contractual tax-
expenditure linkage 
5.Benefits from linkage(and sources): 






violence and tax 
yield 
(1) Countries which formally link, or have linked, some elements of mineral taxation to social protection 
Bolivia Protests against 
extension of personal 
income tax, March 
2003 (c.30 deaths) and 
breaking of blockade in 














and not by 
cooperative







Impuesto Directo en 
los 
Hidrocarburos(IDH, 
or Direct Tax on 
Petroleum 
Revenue): 16% 
(increased to 32% in 
2005) 
81% of Renta Dignidad (universal 
old-age pension) financed from 
IDH corporate income tax in 2014 
(initially 100%); remainder 
financed by privatised 
corporations. 
 
81% of Bono Juancito Pinto 
(subsidy for school expenses, 
including textbooks and lunches) 
financed from IDH proceeds in 
2014, remainder from privatised 






of the bonos (and 
especially the 
Renta Dignidad) 
on the well-being 
of their own 
household; others 
remarked that 
their impact on 
the government’s 
wellbeing was 
greater than the 
impact on 
members of the 
public.(see Table 
A2 below). 
 Poverty headcount 
fell from 65% to 
39%, and inequality 
from 62% to 47%, 
between 2000 and 
2014.Evaluation by 
Escobar Loza et al 
(2010) finds a 









2005 and 2015, and 
we find 
a(weakly)significant 
effect of the bonos 
on the reduction of 
political instability in 














Bolivia (see Table A3 
below).  
 Tax ratio rose from 
19.9% to 28.3% 
between 2005 and 
2013. 
Ecuador Presidents Jamil 
Mahuad and Lucio 
Gutierrez overthrown 
by political unrest in 
2000 and 2005 








(since 2005)  
Tax on extraordinary 
incomes: 70% 
(since 2005) 
(i)Elements of petroleum income 
earmarked for universities, social 
protection and expenditure in 
‘backward’, especially Amazonian, 
provinces in 2006 (Almeida, 2009) 
(ii)Tax-revenue-financed bonds 
used to finance conditional cash 
transfers via human development 
bond in 2006 (Bono de Desarollo 
Humano) (Montúfar, 2009).  
 
 Poverty headcount 
fell from 34 to 12% 
between 2003 and 
2015, and Gini index 
of inequality from 
55 to 48% between 
2000 and 2015.  
 
Political violence fell 
from ‘intermediate’ 
to ‘low’between 
2005 and 2015. 
 
Tax ratio rose from 
18% in 2005 to 23% 
in 2015. 
Venezuela President Hugo Chavez 
defeated Salas Romer 
in peaceful election in 
1998. Since then 
political violence has 
been minor until 
Chavez’ death in 2013; 
escalating political 








from 25% to 
50% in 2003 





Tax on ‘exceptional’ 
prices 
Tax-linked bonds, funded from the 
ISLR increase and after 2008 by 
windfall taxes, used to finance 
conditional cash transfers 
(Montúfar, 2009). These transfers, 
under Chavez after 2004, included 
the Misiones – targeted welfare 
services in the fields of primary 






poverty fell from 
24% in 1990 to 
9.4% by 2007. 
There was also ‘a 
growing body of 
evidence that the 
Misiones and 
community 




poverty fell from 60 
to 35% between 
2000 and 2015, and 
Gini index of 
inequality from 53% 
to 50% between 
1990 and 2015 
(using national 
poverty measures); 
but poverty doubled 
over this period 
according to the 



























increased from ‘low’ 
to ‘intermediate’ 
between 2005 and 
2015 (and to ‘high’ 
after 2017). 
 
Tax ratio fell from 
15 to 11% between 
2005 and 2015. 
Zambia Gradual erosion of 
dominant- party 
political system 
between 2000 and 
2006. In 2006 election, 
no serious political 
violence, but notable 
rise in support for 




mineworkers and the 
unemployed, to which 
the copper windfall tax 








from 3% in 
2011) 
10% duty on 
unprocessed copper 
concentrate 
(also windfall tax 
2008-9) 
Shift from: 
Agricultural subsidies: initiated in 
2006 on maize and other cereal 
crops. Criticised as biased towards 
large farmers by Mofya-Mukuka 




Conditional cash transfers: 
introduced experimentally by 
government in 2010 and then 
scaled up dramatically in 2014 
under World Bank pressure (see 
Zambia Government 2014) 
Positive effect of 
linkage alleged by 
stratified sample 
of respondents in 
Lusaka and 
Copperbelt in 
January 2014. But 
a majority of 
respondents felt 
that minerals tax 




poverty) fell from 
71%(52%) to 
61%(42%) between 






between 2005 and 
2015 (but increased 
to ‘minor’ during 
the election the 
following year). 
 
Tax ratio fell from 
18.5% to 16.1% 
between 2005 and 
2015. 














Ghana Riots in all major cities 
surrounding attempted 
introduction of VAT in 
1995 (c.10 deaths) 









5% (up from 
3% before 
2009) 
Windfall profits tax 
15%, 2000-06). 
 
VAT increase (2.5 
percentage points, 












Conditional cash transfers: 
multiple schemes mostly financed 
by NGOs (for a review see World 
Bank(2011) and Wodon(2012)). 
 Percentage in 
poverty halved 
(from 51% to 25%) 






static between 2005 
and 2015. 
 
Tax ratio increased 
from 13% to 21% 
between 2005 and 
2015. 
 
(2) Countries which informally link some elements of mineral or other taxation to social protection 
Chile Tax on ‘first-
category’ 
incomes, 





None Tax on utility profits 
35% and dividends 
(4%) for public 
enterprises; special 
tax 40% on private 
utility companies 
Expanded social protection 
programmes after return to 
democracy in 1990s and early 
2000s (e.g. Chile Solidario, 
launched under Lagos 
administration in 2002, financed 
by increase of 2% in tax burden, 
distributed across increase in 
corporate taxes, personal income 
taxation and value-added tax). ‘In 
particular, a 2% rise in the value-
added tax rate, from 16 to 18%, 
was explicitly linked to the 





a reaction to the 
fact that before 
2002, all surveys 
were showing a 
fast reduction in 
public support for 
Lagos…The 







$2-a-day poverty fell 
from 20% to 8% 
between 2003-15. 





















in excess of 
R$240,000 
per annum 









Utility tax 15% 1988 constitution created a new 
social contract, with explicit 
recognition of the right to social 
protection as a key principle, 
financed principally by a 2% tax on 
agricultural sales (with the 
balance from social insurance 
funds) (Barrientos 2013: 193) 
 Poverty and 
inequality : 
$2 a day poverty fell 
from 21% to 4% 
between 2003 and 
2015.  
 
Sources : data for Ghana, Zambia and Bolivia from Mosley (2017), chapters 3-5; for Venezuela from essay by Buxton in Grugel and Riggirozzi (2009); for 
Ecuador from World Bank Country Economic Reports. Tax data in cols. 3-5 supplemented by data from Gomez Sabaini et al. (2015), table 2, p.36; data on 
Chile and Brazil in bottom two rows of table also from Barrientos (2013, pp. 191-194). 















 Initial findings from Table 1 are as follows: 
(i) Of the five cases of formal progressive social contracts of which we are aware, four 
have survived from the time of their introduction in the early 2000s to the present. 
The exception is Zambia, where the linkage between the mineral windfall tax and 
social protection expenditures lasted only from 2006 to 2008, and since 2011 has 
been restored in name only. 
(ii) Across all of the five cases of formal linkage between 2003 and 2015, the 
introduction of progressive social contracts is associated with a reduction in 
headcount poverty, measured by the national poverty line. In Bolivia and (more 
ambiguously) in Ghana, there is evidence to suggest this can be seen as a causal 
relationship12. Poverty also declined sharply between 2003-15 in the cases of 
‘informal linkage’ (Chile and Brazil). However, in Venezuela headcount poverty is 
falling only according to the national poverty line and has been rising since the early 
2000s according to the World Bank’s $1.90 a day measure. There is no evidence that 
poverty has declined any less in Ghana, where a high proportion of the population is 
involved in paying contributions to the National Health Insurance Scheme, than in 
the other sample countries where progressive fiscal contracts are imposed only on 
mineral-exporting companies. However, tax revenue has been more unstable in the 
four mineral-exporting countries (and in Zambia and Venezuela has become smaller 
as a proportion of income) than in Ghana. 
(iii)  Across three of the five cases of formal linkage between 2003 and 2015 (Bolivia, 
Ghana, and Ecuador) the introduction of ‘progressive fiscal contracts’ is associated 
with an increase in tax yields over time; and estimating the relationship across the 
entire sample and controlling for endogeneity and confounders, the ‘progressive 
fiscal contracts’ dummy variable has a significant (at the 5% level) impact on overall 
tax yields ( see Appendix table A3 ). However, this tendency does not apply across all 
                                                          
12 A regression-based study by the Bolivian Unit for the Analysis of Economic Policy (UDAPE), Escobar Loza et 
al. (2013), finds that the Renta Dignidad, the universal old-age pension linked to revenue from the IDH 
petroleum tax, increased household per capita consumption by 154 bolivianos per month ($22) or 15.4% of 
average income, and reduced headcount extreme poverty by 156 bolivianos per month ($22) or 16.1%. 
UDAPE’s report (2015) on the Bonos Juancito Pinto (a conditional cash transfer related to primary education) 
and Juana Azurduy (a similar transfer related to maternal and child health) between them, managed to lower 
extreme poverty by 1.5% - 2% between 2006 and 2012. In Ghana, a 2011 study of the National Health 
Insurance Scheme (Dixon et al. 2011) found that in Northern Ghana, the poorest part of the country, 
households were significantly more likely to enrol in the National Health Insurance Scheme than in other parts 
of the country; however, the scheme, according to this same study, showed a tendency to exclude the very 
poorest. 















countries: as illustrated by Table 1, tax yields are falling rapidly over time in 
Venezuela and slowly in Zambia, in defiance of the stimulus which progressive fiscal 
contracts are is expected to provide. This points to the need for finance ministries to 
establish complementary strategies, such as diversification of tax bases and the 
establishment of commodity stabilisation funds which will enable tax yields to hold 
up in periods when commodity prices are falling, such as 2013-16.  
(iv) In Ecuador and Bolivia, the introduction of progressive fiscal contracts is  
 associated with a decline in political violence since the early 2000s (according to the 
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute’s measure). In Bolivia there is 
weak econometric evidence (see Appendix A1) but also qualitative evidence, 
presented in Appendix table A2, to suggest that this decline in political violence may 
be causally related to the introduction of the Renta Dignidad and the Bono Juancito 
Pinto. However, in Venezuela political violence has been on the increase, especially 
since the death of Chavez in 2013. Across the sample as a whole, there is a weak 
(significant at the 10% level) negative influence of the ‘progressive fiscal contracts’ 
dummy variable on the incidence of conflict (Appendix table A3). Indeed, there 
appears, and this is the heart of our story, to be a two-way relationship between 
political instability and the introduction of progressive fiscal contracts. In all cases 
except Venezuela, as discussed above and also in column 2 of Table 1, political 
instability in the late 1990s and early 2000s provided the rationale for introducing a 
tax system based on a more contractual and equitable relationship between 
government and taxpayer, which in turn has been associated (except in Venezuela 
and arguably in Zambia), as noted above, with a diminution in political tensions over 
time. 
  
3.The political economy of progressive fiscal contracts: ways forward 
The development/efficiency trade-off 
 Our basic working hypothesis, then, is that as the incidence of ‘progressive fiscal contracts’ 
increases, that will provide opportunities to reduce poverty, by focussing public expenditure on the 
universalisation of health, education and social protection, which then provides an opportunity to 
increase the political stability of fragile incumbent governments; in addition, it can enable them over 
the medium term to increase their tax ratios, which then enables development expenditures to be 
expanded. Table 1 has provided some support for this hypothesis, and illustrated how, in Bolivia, 















Ecuador and Ghana, the opportunities presented by the device of progressive fiscal contracts have 
been taken advantage of; but it has also illustrated how those opportunities may be wasted, either 
by antagonising the mineral corporations (as in Zambia), or, as in Venezuela, through 
mismanagement of the oil monopoly (PDVSA) and the entire economy. 
 However, these results only present the benefit side of the equation. If we are to get a more 
complete picture of how to make progressive fiscal contracts work, we need to take account of a 
factor so far excluded from the analysis, namely the efficiency cost imposed by taxation on output 
and productivity. All taxation, of course, reduces the incentive to work and is in that sense 
inefficient; but earmarking specific headings of tax revenue to specific items of public expenditure, 
as progressive fiscal contracts do, runs the risk of preventing tax revenue from being spent on the 
public expenditure items with highest productivity (rate of return). Because of this, the theoretical 
public finance literature tends to advise against earmarking and engaging in ‘fiscal contracts’ of any 
sort (Musgrave, 1961 and later editions). 
 However, the efficiency cost inflicted by the introduction of progressive fiscal contracts is 
not a constant, but varies according to the way such contracts are designed. Other things being 
equal, that cost will be higher: 
 - the more taxation is imposed on production (e.g. in the form of a royalty) rather than on net 
income or profits, as royalty-type taxes provide more of a disincentive to productivity and 
competitiveness in the taxed sector; 
 - the further the rate of taxation on natural resource incomes gets out of line with the rate of 
taxation on other forms of income, as any kind of tax imposes a distortion, but, other things being 
equal, the distortion is minimised if tax rates can be kept uniform; 
 - and the more rigid is the linkage from natural resource taxation to public expenditure, since in 
times of falling export prices for oil and other natural resources (such as 2008-9 and 2014-16) a rigid 
link between a particular form of social protection expenditure implies that such pro-poor 
expenditure must fall when the designated revenue source falls, which has an obvious social cost.  
 
 Thus, we are faced with a trade-off: certainly, progressive fiscal contracts inflict efficiency 
costs, but as we have seen, they also have multiple other potential benefits. We represent this 
trade-off in Figure 1 as a straight line, from A1 to A2 to A3. As the proportion of taxation which is 
linked to specific forms of public expenditure by means of a fiscal contract increases, we move 















northeastward up that line. Public preferences as between the political and social benefits 
associated with progressive fiscal contracts are represented by the preference function B1, B2, etc. 
Welfare improves as we move north-westward on the diagram. 
Figure 1. Costs and benefits of ‘progressive fiscal contracts’ 
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additional social and fiscal benefits, for a given level of tax revenue, over and above those currently 
achieved, then the trade-off A1A3 will rise: the ‘technology’ of fiscal contract formation will have 
improved13. But in addition, it is possible for government to lower the efficiency cost associated with 
progressive fiscal contracts, by reducing the proportion of revenue which is derived from royalties 
and other taxes levied at a flat rate per ton (say), and contain no inbuilt incentive to increase 
efficiency, and increasing the proportion derived from income and profits taxes, which does contain 
such an incentive14. So, if the Peruvian government (to quote an actual empirical example) increases 
the share of taxation derived from income and profits taxes, as it did between 2000 and 2013, that 
will (cet.par.) reduce the efficiency costs associated with progressive fiscal contracts and lift the 
trade-off – as depicted in Figure 1 -, from A1A3 to A*1 A*3. The social optimum rises from A2 to A*2: a 
lower resource (efficiency) cost is now inflicted by a given level of social benefit provided by the new 
fiscal contract. 
 Bearing in mind these possibilities, and these ambiguities in the definition of an optimal fiscal policy, 
what scope is there for using progressive fiscal contracts in a more effective way? 
The economic losses from linked taxation, and how to mitigate them 
 Several studies of the losses to productivity from progressive taxation have been done, 
including two by ourselves, for Bolivia and Zambia (Mosley, 2014a, 2014b; see also Oporto et al 
(2012) for Bolivia, Oxford Policy Management (2014) for Zambia, etc). These estimates differ sharply 
by type of economy - in particular, countries such as Bolivia and Ghana which have a large artisanal, 
or co-operative, mining sector have tended to experience a larger fall in productivity over the last 
ten years than countries operating along a much more rigid production function, as is characteristic 
of oil-based economies such as Ecuador and Venezuela. (By contrast, the former type of economy 
has tended to generate larger increases in employment from its mining sector, and often greater 
improvements in equity as well.)15  
 However, as illustrated by Table 2, the fear that natural-resource intensive countries, in 
order to maximise revenue, would move away from ‘efficient’ forms of taxation (such as corporate 
                                                          
13 As a further example: the discovery of conditional cash transfers as a highly successful medium for providing 
social protection outside the formal sector of developing countries (Banerjee et al. (2015), as in the Bolivia and 
Zambia cases documented in this paper, has markedly increased the effectiveness of the progressive fiscal 
transfers instrument, and ‘moved the trade-off upwards’, in the notation of Figure 1 above.  
14 Exogenous shocks can also move the trade-off: for example, an increase in political instability will move the 
trade-off upwards (as in the Venezuela case in our study), and a decrease will move it down (as in the Bolivia 
and Ecuador cases).  
15 For example, the mining sector of Bolivia simply between 2011 and 2013 experienced an 18% fall in 
productivity, but a 13% increase in employment. See Mosley (2014b, figure 4, p.33).  















income taxes) which tax profits rather than gross income, and thereby make taxation of mining and 
oil companies less efficient, is not borne out by the data. Between 2000-03 and 2010-13, the ratio of 
revenue derived from ‘more distortive’ royalties to total revenue declines, in the core ‘progressive 
fiscal contract’ cases, from 45% to 39%. In the ‘informal linked taxation cases’ such as Brazil and 
Chile, similarly, the proportion of total tax revenue derived from royalties declined from 56% to 45%. 
It therefore appears, prima facie, that that the hoped-for shift from ‘less efficient’ to ‘more efficient’ 
mineral taxes consequential on efforts to drive up revenue has in a modest way materialised. 
 
Table 2. Hydrocarbon and mineral taxes: allocation of tax revenue between types of duties 
2000-13 
(percentages of total) 
 
 Instrument 2000-2003  2005-2008 2010-2013 
Core ‘linked taxation’ cases 











































































































































































































































































Source: All Latin American countries: Gomez Sabaini et al (2015, table 4, p. 47). Ghana: 
estimated from Mosley (2015b), table 2, page 8. Zambia: estimated from Mosley (2014a, 
table 3, p. 12). 
 However, against this general trend, we may note a discrepancy between the behaviour of 
the Latin American and African ‘progressive fiscal contract’ cases. In Latin America, consistently with 
the general trend, the ratio of royalty income to total revenue declines, but in the two African cases, 
Ghana and Zambia, it goes up substantially (from 40% to 62%), in spite of an increase in corporate 
income tax rates in both countries. In both countries, also, there was a politically popular 















experiment with windfall taxation of mineral exports in the mid-2000s (classed as ‘other sources of 
revenue’ in Table 2), which, however, was transient and failed to last. 
4.Conclusions 
 The recent policy innovation of ‘progressive fiscal contracts’ has offered developing countries, 
especially fragile ones which have had difficulty in raising tax revenue, the attractive prospect of 
multiple political and economic benefits: less political violence, lower poverty, and an increase in tax 
yields, offering scope for developmental public expenditure. However, to a degree depending on the 
way they are designed, such programmes may also inflict resource costs caused by the restriction 
they impose on government’s ability to select the highest-yielding public expenditure projects. 
 Our analysis has examined the experience of five developing countries which have 
introduced progressive fiscal contracts over the last twenty years, often in the hope of reaping 
political benefits and making the state more secure, plus a further two (Brazil and Chile) where 
politicians have made public statements of linkage between particular tax changes and particular 
expenditure headings but not converted these into law. In all of these countries, headcount poverty 
has fallen over the period 2003-2015, and in all except Zambia and Venezuela, tax ratios have risen 
also. Notably in Bolivia, and to a lesser extent in Ecuador and Ghana also, we have qualitative and 
quantitative evidence that these trends have not only been associated with, but also caused by, the 
advent of progressive fiscal contracts. In Ghana, however, these positive economic impacts are 
counteracted by an increase in the share of royalty income in total taxation, which increased the 
efficiency costs of taxation. 
 In Zambia and Venezuela, by contrast, the tax ratio did not increase over time, and there is 
no evidence that the introduction of progressive fiscal contracts yielded long-term benefits. The 
reasons differ as between the two cases. In Zambia, the introduction of local-level welfare benefits 
linked to windfall taxes on mineral exports lasted only from 2006 to 2008, and was then abandoned, 
because a middle-of the-road ruling party was replaced after the President’s death by a right-wing 
populist party which feared that the mining companies would desert the country if the windfall tax 
(and indeed most corporate income taxes) were persisted with. In Venezuela, the abandonment of 
progressive fiscal contracts linked to oil taxation was never formally announced, but was made 
inevitable when, after the death of President Chàvez, his successor, Nicolás Maduro, embarked on 
an authoritarian path, leading to political conflict and eventually hyperinflation which made the 
implementation of a long-term ‘fiscal contract’, or indeed a social contract of any sort, impossible. 















 Our analysis, therefore, provides moderately strong evidence that linked progressive 
taxation can have a useful role in enabling poor countries to escape from the ‘low tax–low public 
expenditure–low growth’ trap—if the ruling regime has the stability and the will to sustain overall 
tax effort. Where it does not—as our Zambian and Venezuelan evidence shows—there is not much 
which fiscal contracts can do to paper over the underlying problems of governance. 
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 Appendix. Regressions and qualitative materials 
Table A1 estimates the impact of the main anti-poverty measures (the Renta Dignidad and 
Bono Juancito Pinto) financed out of the IDH petroleum tax since 2005, on various measures of 
political instability, controlling for GDP growth, the Gini coefficient of inequality and military 















centrality, over the period 1990-2015. It is likely that the selected measures of political instability 
determine as well as being determined by the anti-poverty measures mentioned, and so the 
estimation is mainly by three-stage least squares (3SLS), with OLS results presented in the final 
column for comparison. 
Table A1. Determinants of political instability in Bolivia: regression-based estimates16 
 Equation (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Estimation method 
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16 An earlier version of this table appeared in Chapter 5 of Mosley’s book Fiscal Policy and the Natural Resource 
Curse (Mosley 2017). Reproduced by permission of Taylor and Francis Publishers through PLSclear. 















Bono Juancito Pinto 
and Bono Juana 
Azurduy) as % of  
total expenditure 
Military centrality 
(share of military 















  -1.05 
(0.29) 
  
Budget surplus or 
deficit 





R2 0.33 0.26 0.26 0.37 0.39 0.63 
Number of 
observations 
23 23 23 23 23 23 
 
Estimation method: 3SLS. Period of estimation: annual data 1990-2013. Student’s t-statistics in 
parentheses underneath coefficients. ***denotes significance of a coefficient at the 1% level, ** at 
the 5% level and *** at the 1% level. 
Sources: for dependent variables – 
‘Instability 1’ (number of persons killed). From our own dataset for 1979-2007, updated by the 
author: available from www.poverty.group.shef.ac. uk or from the author. 
‘Instability 2’ (days lost in conflicts). From our own dataset for 1979-2007, updated by the author: 
available from www.poverty.group.shef.ac.uk or from the author. 
‘Instability 3’ (number of conflicts) Original data from CERES, Observatorio de Conflictos. Data from 
1990-2004 are presented in Laserna (2011), and I am grateful to Roberto Laserna for discussions. 
For independent variables, all data are from Bolivia, Instituto Nacional de Estadistica (INE), Anuario 
Estadistico 2012, and updates of these series from the INE website www. ine.gob.bo, except the 
data for ‘social protection expenditure linked to a fiscal contract’ (row 6) which are from Mosley 
(2017) Table 5.6, and the Polity index of institutional capacity, which is at www.systemicpeace.org. 
Table A2 provides qualitative interview evidence concerning the effect of the bonos. 















Table A2. Bolivia: Respondents’ views on public spending and ‘earmarked’ social 
protection measures17  
(sample = 48 randomly-selected respondents in La Paz and El Alto, stratified across social classes, 
interviewed in August 2014). 
 Renta Dignidad 
(non-contributory 
state pension) 




Bono Juana Azurduy 
(conditional cash transfers 
for expectant mothers and 
mothers of newborns) 
% of respondents with 
a beneficiary within 
the household 
50 24 23 
Impact on economic 
stability: summary of 
views of recipients 
A majority of 
respondents felt the 
impact was positive. 
But some felt the 
impact was short-term 
only, and some felt 
that it was actually 
counter-productive, 
see discussion below. 
Others e.g.respondent 
3 felt that the Renta 
should be made more 
progressive – e.g. that 
it should be increased 
in respect of the most 
vulnerable only. 
Most felt the impact 
was on balance 
positive; but some 
felt the bond should 
be paid in cash 
rather than as an 
electronic transfer, 
and one respondent 
(respondent 3, see 
below) felt that the 
Bono was not 
successful at 
reducing truancy 
even in the short 
term. 
Most felt that the effect 
was on balance positive; 
but some respondents 
reported perverse effects, 
for example respondent 1 
suggested that women 
were incentivised to have 
additional children on 
account of the Bono, see 
below. 
Relevance of linkage 
between 
hydrocarbons income 
and social protection: 
summary of views of 
recipients 
Most respondents 
thought the link 
positive and was 
politically valuable. 
Most respondents 
thought the link 
positive. But some 
respondents 
e.g.respondent 3 
thought the link was 
‘purely symbolic’ 
 
Source: Author’s survey, August 201418.  
In relation to all of the bonds, many recipients, especially in the professional group, backed 
up the quantitative evidence of Table A1 suggesting that the impact of the Renta Dignidad on 
political stability was positive (e.g. respondent 3 (professional, La Paz) who stated that the bonds 
                                                          
17 An earlier version of this table appeared in Chapter 5 of Mosley’s book Fiscal Policy and the Natural Resource 
Curse (Mosley 2017). Reproduced by permission of Taylor and Francis Publishers through PLSclear. 
18 The surveys reported in Table 3 were carried out on a randomly chosen sample of 48 respondents, evenly 
divided between La Paz and El Alto on the western Bolivian altiplano. In each of the two cities, the sample was 
stratified between equal numbers of males and females and between four occupational groups: public and 
private sector professionals, manual formal-sector workers and informal-sector workers. 















‘have stabilised and calmed people’ and respondent 4 (professional, La Paz), who stated that 
political stability in Bolivia had improved ‘because the State is using natural resources to satisfy 
people’s economic needs’, thereby suggesting that it was the connection between natural resources 
taxation and social protection, rather than social protection on its own, which was helping to make 
the country more stable. However, a majority of respondents felt that in spite of this, the level of 
political stability in Bolivia had declined since 2009, which is in conflict with the quantitative 
evidence; and a number of respondents felt that the design of the bonds could be improved. Several 
of them, especially in the manual worker sub-group, suggested that the bonds were a short-term fix 
(in Spanish, palliativo) which was good for the government but not for the country: this actual 
phrase was used, unprompted, by respondents 25 (miner, El Alto), 31(retired pastrycook, La Paz) and 
39 (student, El Alto). Some respondents suggested, probably correctly, that the motivation behind 
the programmes was principally political, for example respondent 13 (professional male, 40, El Alto) 
remarked: ‘It has helped the government protect itself, but it has not tackled the problem at its 
root’19.  
Finally, table A3 presents panel-data regressions illustrating the effect of linked taxation on 
political stability and tax revenue compared across the five countries discussed in table 1 between 
1990 and 2015 (linked export taxation is represented as a one-zero dummy covering the years when 
such taxation was in effect). In column 1 of the table, the impact of progressive fiscal contracts on 
political instability (measured as the degree of conflict in a country) , estimated by OLS, emerges as 
significant at the 10% level across this sample of countries. In column 2 of the table, we estimate the 
impact of linked taxation on the overall tax ratio both by OLS (in column 2 of the table) and, in 
columns 3 through 6, we trace, using 3SLS estimation, the entire chain of causation from linked 
progressive taxation through to the expenditure ratio to the growth and poverty outcome (as in 
Figure 1), using, in the last of those equations, population and lagged 1988 values of GNP per capita 
as instruments for overseas aid. In this equation system, a higher tax ratio increases public 
expenditure (eq.4), which (eq.5) increases growth and reduces poverty. Linked taxation is a 
significant and positive determinant of the tax ratio (at the 5% level) in both the OLS and 3SLS 
models and thus, in our interpretation, plays a part in state-building through its ability initially to 
build and diversify the tax base, thence public expenditure, and thence investment and growth.  
                                                          
19 Some respondents went further than this, and suggested that the bonds might have disincentive (or 
perverse) effects even in the short term. Respondent 3 (professional female, 28, El Alto), suggested that the 
Bono Juancito Pinto ‘was not achieving its fundamental objective of reducing truancy’ and respondent 1 (male, 
38, informal sector, El Alto) suggested that women ‘were having additional children’ as a consequence of the 
incentive provided by the Bono Juana Azurduy. More vaguely, suggestions were made that the Renta Dignidad 
encouraged a ‘beggar mentality’ and ‘involved a waste of resources’ (e.g. respondents 6, 7 and 16). 















Table A3. Impact of the tax ratio on political instability and tax capacity: regression-based 
estimates 
 Equation (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Estimation 
Method 












































   






    
Share of trade taxes 
to total revenue 
-0.002 
(1.33) 
     
Public expenditure on 
health and education 






   
Tax/GDP ratio    1.67*** 
(3.54) 
  
Aid/GDP ratio     2.61*** 
(9.40) 
 






    -0.29* 
(1.74) 
 
Population      0.073*** 
(3.19) 
GNP per capita in 
1988 
     -0.016*** 
(7.94) 
R2 0.04 0.28 0.44 0.17 0.59 0.73 
Number of 
observations 
75 44 31 31 31 31 
Source: World Bank, Global Development Indicators database. 
Sample: Countries in which ‘progressive fiscal contracts’ have been used: Bolivia, Ecuador, 
Venezuela, Zambia, Ghana, Mauritius (see Table 1 above for more detail) 
Notes: (1) ‘Progressive fiscal contracts’ is a one-zero dummy variable taking the value one 
during the years linked taxation was in force and zero at other times. 















 (2)***/**/* against a coefficient denote significance at the 1%/5%/10% levels. 
 
 (3)Incidence of conflict is measured by means of the World Bank ucdp_loc measure (see 
www.qog.gu.se) which allocates a value of 3 to situations of severe conflict, 2 to moderate 
conflict, 1 to minor conflict and 0 to no or insignificant conflict. 
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